We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium (WE) directly from Nash's theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we use a variant of the Shapley-Shubik trading-post game.
Introduction
The paper of Nash (1950) on the existence of equilibrium points in noncooperative games was historically critical for Walrasian analysis. In order to prove existence of Walras equilibrium, Arrow and Debreu (1954) , Debreu (1952) , Debreu (1962) extended Nash's model to "generalized games" and added a fictitious price player (whose payoff was "the value of excess demand") to the economy. Walras equilibria (WE) were than obtained as Nash equilibria (NE) of a generalized game that included the price player.
We show that WE exist without stepping outside the original framework of Nash. In fact, WE are the limits of NE of a sequence of games Γ (M) . No price player is involved nor are generalized games. The games Γ(M) adhere completely to the standard format laid out by Nash: each player has a compact, convex strategy-set; and a continuous payoff function which is concave in his own strategy. We do replace each original agent in the economy by a type consisting of a continuum of identical agents. 1 But since we restrict to type-symmetric (TS) strategies, all measure-theoretic technicalities are avoided. By an analysis identical to that of Nash, we verify the existence of TSNE, and hence of a WE.
Our game is a variant of the Shapley-Shubik trading-post game (Shapley, 1976; Shapley and Shubik, 1977; Shubik, 1973) . It is defined by a continuous map from agents' "bids" (strategies) to prices and feasible reallocations (outcomes). To our mind, the most salient feature of the game-theoretic approach is that there is such a map, no matter what strategies agents choose, a feasible outcome is always engendered. In Walrasian analysis we are left in the dark as to what happens out of equilibrium.
The search for game-theoretic foundations of Walras equilibrium has a long and rich history. In his famous paper, Cournot (1838) introduced a basic model in which firms compete at a single market by strategically choosing how much output to produce and sell. The Cournot game is the archetypal example of a Nash game with continuous, concave payoffs. Equilibrium always exists, and Cournot himself observed that as the number of agents increases, price-taking behavior is induced and WE is achieved in the limit. Bertrand (1883) defined another game in which prices are the strategic variables, and showed that NE coincide with WE, provided there are at least two competing firms. The Bertrand game, however, has discontinuous payoffs and so is not in the Nash format.
The single market analyses of Cournot and Bertrand were extended by many authors to come to grips with multiple markets in general equilibrium. Following the Bertrand tradition naturally led to discontinuous games. In Dubey (1982) , Hurwicz (1979) , Schmeidler (1980) , coincidence of NE and WE was established, but the authors relied on the existence of WE to show the existence of their NE, rather than the other way around.
The extension of the Cournot tradition to general equilibrium was pioneered by Shapley (1976) , Shapley and Shubik (1977) , Shubik (1973) . The difficulty to overcome is that an agent might want to sell in one market and buy in another. How can the Walras budget set be incorporated in the game? One possibility is to introduce a market for every pair of commodities, as in Amir et al. (1990) . But this does not necessarily yield consistent prices, and so there may be NE which are very far from WE; thus the existence of NE does not imply that of WE. A different approach, taken by Shapley and Shubik, was eloquently described by Shapley (1976) :
The decisive step was to meet the problem of money head on-to accept the proposition that, in the world of buying and selling, money is "real." Granting this, the rest falls into place with remarkably few other generality-restricting assumptions.
Shapley and Shubik explicitly introduced money as the stipulated medium of exchange. Their model was carried forward by several others, who took up the theme of showing that Cournot-Nash equilibria converge to Walras equilibria. Curiously, however, the most direct route from Nash to Walras seems to have been missed. In Dubey and Shapley (1994) , Shapley (1976) , Shapley and Shubik (1977) , and Shubik (1973) , the money is one of the intrinsically valuable commodities, and convergence only obtains under special conditions on the endowments and preferences of the economy. In general, there may not be enough of the commodity money to sustain all the WE trades. This suggests the introduction of fiat money, and in particular of "inside" fiat money, which can be borrowed by all agents and must be repaid after trade. But, with borrowing, the possibility of default must also be reckoned with. In Jaynes et al. (1978) , Peck and Shell (1985) , and Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1978) , there is inside fiat money and NE converge to WE, but the games do not conform to the Nash format: harsh, discontinuous penalties are imposed on those who default (e.g. confiscation of all consumption), converting the game-at bottom-into a generalized game. In Dubey and Shapley (1994) , Shubik and Wilson (1977) genuine Nash games are presented, which also entail the coincidence of NE and WE. But once again the existence of NE is inferred from that of WE. It seems worthwhile to us (at the very least from a pedagogical point-of-view) to describe a simple variant of the Shapley-Shubik model which adheres to the Nash format, and whose NE can easily be shown to converge to WE, under the standard assumptions on the underlying economy.
In our game Γ(M), inside fiat money is the sole medium of exchange, and a "trading-post" is set up for each commodity ∈ L in the economy. Every agent t puts up his entire 2 endowment e t for sale at post . Agents initially have no money, but can borrow up to M at zero interest from a bank. They then choose how much money to bid at each post for purchases. An external agent also bids one dollar at each post to trigger trade there. The bank and the external agent and the trading-posts are all strategic dummies. They have no choices to make and so, unlike the price player in Debreu, they do not optimize. Prices p form at each post as the ratio of total money bid to total commodity received at post .
An agent t who bids β units of money at post receives x t = β /p units of commodity in return. He also obtains p e t units of money as sales revenue. This describes how prices mediate trade. Notice that the trading-posts always clear and generate a feasible reallocation of the endowments, no matter what the agents bid. (Thus in our scenario markets always clear. If, in addition, agents optimize, we obtain an NE. By contrast, in Walrasian analysis, agents always optimize, and markets clear only at WE.) Every agent t in our game obtains the payoff
The max term reflects the fact that h gets no utility from consuming fiat money, but is penalized for defaulting on his loan. 3 The game Γ(M) depends on the borrowing limit M which compactifies agents' strategy spaces. By Nash's theorem, Γ(M) has a TSNE. As M → ∞, limits of the TSNE yield WE. This is so even though the strategy sets and the default penalties are defined completely independently of the characteristics of the agents in the economy. We prove that if some agents default, other agents must be bidding less than their sales revenue. The defaulters in effect rob from those who end up with surplus. This drives the latter to borrow and spend up to the limit M, pushing prices p(M) higher as M → ∞. Eventually the default penalty does bite and chokes off real default.
To the best of our knowledge, the only genuine games whose NE were shown to exist and to converge to WE in general were given by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2001) , Sahi and Yao (1989) , and (inspired by Sahi-Yao) by Sorin (1996) . In Dubey and Geanakoplos (2001) the model introduces outside money, along with inside money, and an endogenous positive interest rate. By eschewing these, the model we present now is simpler and reveals a more direct route from Nash to Walras. The models in Sahi and Yao (1989) and Sorin (1996) are an order of magnitude more complex than ours, and also impose somewhat stronger conditions on the underlying economy.
Walras equilibrium
Let H = {1, . . . , H} be the set of households and L = {1, . . . , L} the set of commodities. For h ∈ H, e h ∈ R L + is the endowment and u h : R L + → R the utility of consumption of household h. We assume, for all h ∈ H, 
Nash equilibrium

Consider a continuum of agents (0, H] made up of types
has endowment e t = e h and utility u t = u h . The underlying population measure is Lebesgue.
For every commodity ∈ L, there is a "trading-post" to which agents send commodity for sale and (fiat) money for purchase. For simplicity we suppose that they put up their entire endowment for sale so that the post receives 4 H 0 e h dt = h∈H e h ≡ē units of 4 We write 
and also obtains p (b)e t units of money as revenue from the sale of his endowment e t , leaving him with the "net deficit"
The payoff to t from the outcome (
The max term reflects the fact agents gain no utility from consuming fiat money, but incur disutility from defaulting on their loans.
Observe that the trading posts simply redistribute everything they receive. Since the external agent sends L dollars and no commodities to the posts, and receives commodities but no money in return, we must have
Thus the trading post mechanism guarantees the feasibility of the final allocation to agents, no matter what they bid, and regardless of whether or not they are optimizing.
A measurable choice b * :
where b| t β is the same as b except that b t is replaced by β.
A choice b : (0, H] → S(M) is called type-symmetric if b t = b h whenever t ∈ (h−1, h], and h ∈ H. In this case, we write b ≡ (b 1 , . . . , b H ).
A type-symmetric NE will be denoted TSNE.
From Nash to Walras
Existence of Nash equilibrium
For any type-symmetric choice of strategies b = (b 1 , . (b 1 , . ϕ = (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ H ) . By Kakutani's theorem it has a fixed point which is easily seen to be a TSNE. 
. . , b H ) ∈ (S(M)) H consider the set ϕ t (b) of best replies of any agent t
∈ (h − 1, h] to b ϕ t (b) = arg max β∈S(M) Π t (b| t β) = arg max β∈S(M)    u h β p (b) ∈L − ∈L β − ∈L p (b)e h +   
By symmetry, ϕ t (b) is the same for all t ∈ (h − 1, h] and we denote it ϕ h (b). From the fact that β does not affect p(b), i.e. p(b) = p(b| t β), it follows that x t (p(b), β) and d t (p(b), β) are linear in β (for fixed b), and hence Π(b| t β) is concave in β. Since S(M) is convex, we conclude that so is ϕ h (b). We view Π t as a function from (S(M)) H × S(M) to R. Clearly Π t is continuous in
. . , b H , β). Hence by the maximum principle, the correspondence ϕ h : (S(M)) H ⇒ S(M) is compact valued and upper semi-continuous. Therefore, so is the correspondence ϕ : (S(M)) H ⇒ (S(M)) H defined by
Walras equilibria as limits of Nash equilibria
For each integer M ≥ 1, let b(M) = (b h (M)) h∈H be a TSNE in Γ(M), with prices p(M) and outcomes (x h (M), d h (M)) h∈H . Since commodities are conserved by the trading posts, h∈H x h (M) ≤ē (with the external agent receivingē − h∈H x h (M)). In particular, each x h (M) is uniformly bounded. Furthermore, since any agent of type h always has the option of spending and consuming nothing, u h (ē)
− d h + (M) ≥ u h (x h (M)) − d h + (M) ≥ u h (0). Hence d h + (M) is also uniformly bounded above by u h (ē) − u h (0). Let δ(M) = {h ∈ H : d h (M) > 0}
h∈δ(M) d h (M) + h∈σ(M) d h (M). Since money is conserved by the trading posts
Observe first that σ(M) = ϕ because L > 0. Every agent of type h ∈ σ(M) must be spending up to his limit M, for otherwise he could spend a little more at each post, consuming strictly more of every commodity, without incurring any default, contradicting that he is optimizing at the TSNE. Since he is running a surplus, p(M)e h > M, which shows ||p(M)|| → ∞ as fast as M.
Since surpluses and deficits are uniformly bounded in M, it follows immediately that d h (M)/||p(M)|| = (p(M)/||p(M)||)(x h (M)
− e h ) → 0, and thus p(x h − e h ) = 0 for all h ∈ H. Since we already have h∈H x h ≤ h∈H e h , it only remains to verify that if
). Take 0 < λ < 1. Then, since e 0 and so px h = pe h > 0, we have pλy ≤ λpe h = λpx h < px h and so for large M,
Since b h (M) gives a payoff at least as high as β h (M), yet incurs at least as much penalty, u h (x h (M)) ≥ u h (λy). Passing to the limit, u h (x h ) ≥ u h (λy). But λ < 1 was arbitrary. Hence u h (x h ) ≥ u h (y).
From Nash to Walras in greater generality
Without concavity
Extending the game Γ(M) to nonconcave u h would seem to be folly. For example, if u h : R + → R is defined by u h (x) = x 2 , then all agents of type h will wish to go infinitely bankrupt. But things are not so bad after all. They cannot borrow or bid more than M. We shall see that an NE always exists in Γ(M), though agents of the same type may choose different (but indifferent!) strategies. Passing to the limit as M → ∞, we again obtain a WE.
We retain all the other hypotheses except for the concavity of u h . To see that an NE of Γ(M) exists, replace the correspondence . . . , λ h(L+1) . Let the agents in the hith interval choose the strategyb hi . This gives us an NE in which each type indulges in at most L + 1 different bids. 5 For
Passing to a subsequence, we may assume that λ hi (M) → λ hi for all h and i.
0}. Then {i:hi∈G} λ hi = 1 for all h ∈ H. Furthermore, by feasibility in (M), x hi (M) is uniformly bounded across M for hi ∈ G. Hence we can take convergent subsequences x hi (M) → x hi for all hi ∈ G. Also (by the old argument) d hi + (M) is uniformly bounded for all hi ∈ G. Our previous proof that p(M) → ∞ as fast as M remains intact. Observe next that for any agent t ∈ (0, H], his deficit d t (M) is bounded above and below independent of t (though no longer of M), i.e.
It follows that
is uniformly bounded above for all hi ∈ G, so we conclude that
Treating the types hi ∈ G exactly as our H types earlier, the proof proceeds as before. We obtain a Walras equilibrium in the limit.
With quasi-concavity
Assume that the utilities are quasi-concave. 
Without positivity of endowments
Let us return to the case of concave utilities, but now replace e h 0 with e h > 0 and h∈H e h 0. Were we to assume irreducibility, we could easily modify our argument to obtain WE in the limit. Without such an assumption, what do we get?
It is easy to see that TSNE still exist in Γ(M), since we never used e h 0 in that part of the argument. Indeed the convergence of TSNE as M → ∞ proceeded all the way to a limit (p, (x h Here commodities are partitioned into sets (strata) L = L 1 ∪ · · · ∪ L k and it is understood that commodities in L γ+1 are infinitely more valuable than those in L γ (i.e. L γ+1 is a higher "stratum" than L γ ); or, to put it another way, the money involved in the trade of L γ+1 has an exchange rate of infinity, relative to the money of
Assume we have a convergent subsequence of TSNE, with p (M)/p j (M) converging possibly to zero or infinity. Define to be in the same strata as j if 0 < lim M→∞ p (M)/ p j (M) < ∞; and to be in a higher strata than j if lim M→∞ p (M)/p j (M) = ∞. Then we obtain a stratification of the commodities. For each strata γ and
It is easy to see that, with these prices, we have a stratified WE.
Stratified WE, to the best of our knowledge, were first defined and shown to exist in Danilov and Sotskov (1990) . For more discussion, see Florig (2001) and Mertens (1996) .
Finitely many agents
We assumed a continuum of agents to ease the transition from NE to WE. But our argument works equally well when there is a finite set of agents converging to a continuum. First, NE exist in the finite case, once again by Nash's proof. (The only thing to check is concavity of payoffs. But (. . . , b h , . . . ) ) in b h , using the fact that u h is both concave and monotonic.) We move towards the continuum by considering k "replicas" for each h ∈ H = {1, . . . , H}, all of whom have the same endowments and preferences as h. This yields the game Γ k (M) with kH agents. By the standard symmetrization of Nash's argument, a TSNE exists in Γ k (M) . We take k = M and consider a sequence of TSNE of Γ M (M), M → ∞. As before, some type must run a surplus, and all M agents of that type bid M (since outcome is strictly monotonic in bids). So total expenditures are of the order of MM = M 2 , and since total expenditures equal L+p(M)M h e h , it follows that ||p(M)|| → ∞ as fast as M. Moreover the defaults d h (M) stay bounded as before, which implies that there exists a subsequence of TSNE whose consumptions and normalized prices ((x h (M) (x h ). This, in turn, will follow if we can show that αy is feasible 6 for any agent of type h in Γ M (M) without incurring default, for any 0 < α < 1 and large enough M. Let L + = { ∈ L : p > 0} and L 0 = { ∈ L : p = 0}. For all ∈ L + , the total bid on is growing like M 2 . So an agent of type h has negligible (percentage) influence on p (M) by unilaterally varying his bid between 0 and M on any commodity ∈ L + (for large enough M). 
